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Abstract 
This paper studies decision making for Wal­
ley's partially consonant belief functions 
(pcb ) . In a pcb, the set of foci are par­
titioned. Within each partition, foci are 
nested. The pcb class includes probability 
and possibility functions as extreme cases. 
We adopt an axiomatic system, similar in 
spirit to von Neumann and Morgenstern's ax­
ioms for preferences leading to the linear util­
ity theory, for a preference relation on pcb 
lotteries. We prove a representation theo­
rem for this preference relation. Utility for 
a pcb lottery is a combination of linear util­
ity for probabilistic lottery and binary utility 
for possibilistic lottery. 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, Dempster-Shafer's (DS) belief func­
tion theory [3, 11, 13] has drawn an increasing interest 
in the artificial intelligence and statistics community. 
The main appeal of the DS theory is its ability to faith­
fully express a wider class of uncertainty than is ex­
pressible by standard probability. Another advantage, 
as the belief function proponents argue, is that in the 
DS theory, uncertainty is closely linked to evidence, 
which is the objective source of uncertainty. 
The statistical inference problem is an important back­
ground for belief function theory. Dempster [3] and 
Shafer [12] have demonstrated how belief function the­
ory generalizes Bayesian statistical inference. This 
generalization allows prior knowledge as well as condi­
tional models to be described by belief functions rather 
than by probability functions. 
The inclusion of Bayesian inference as a special case 
also gives rise to an opportunity for checking the va­
lidity of belief function theory against a number of 
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fundamental principles on which statistics is founded. 
Walley [14] studies two functionals Q and R that rep­
resent, in terms of belief functions, observational and 
prior evidences, respectively. He finds (see Theorem 3) 
that in order to be consistent with Bayes rule, observa­
tions must be represented by special belief functions. 
In this class, the set of foci are partitioned. Within 
each partition, foci are nested. Such belief functions 
are called partially consonant or pcb for short. The 
partially consonant class is rich enough to include as 
special cases probability functions (each singleton is a 
partition) and possibility functions (there is only one 
element in the partition). 
Initially, consonant belief functions were used by 
Shafer [11] to represent statistical evidence. Later, 
Shafer [12] renounces the idea on the grounds that 
the set of consonant belief functions is not closed un­
der Dempster's rule of combination. This property is 
desirable because from a statistical point of view, a 
series of independent observations can be viewed as a 
single (compound) observation. So either Dempster's 
rule is not suitable for combination of independent ev­
idences or the consonant form is not appropriate for 
representation of evidence. Shafer gives up the latter 
and keeps the former. However, Walley [14], facing the 
same choices, comes to a different conclusion. Argu­
ing that (1) the conditions by which Dempster's rule is 
consistent with Bayes' rule are too restrictive, and (2) 
Dempster's rule is not unique in satisfying a number 
of desirable properties, Walley concludes that Demp­
ster's rule is neither suitable for combining indepen­
dent observations nor for combining prior belief with 
observational evidence. 
One open problem is the use of belief functions for de­
cision making. The main problem here is that a depar­
ture from probability also means the loss of Bayesian 
decision theory which ranks alternatives by maximum 
expected utilities (EU). A number of proposals for de­
cision making with belief functions have been proposed 
in literature. One basic idea is to find a transformation 
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that converts a given belief function into a probability 
function and then use the probability function for deci­
sion making [13]. vNM linear utility can be brought to 
use for belief functions, which could be viewed as lower 
probabilities [7]. Another approach is to use tech­
niques developed for more general uncertainty mea­
sure, e.g., lower prevision [15], capacity [10, 9], which 
includes belief functions as a special class. We will 
discuss these works in more details in Section 5. 
In this paper, we will propose a decision theory as­
suming that uncertainty is represented by a pcb. The 
paper is structured as follows. The derivation of pcb 
by Walley is reviewed in the next section. In section 
3, after a brief review of the vNM axioms that lead 
to expected utility (EU) representation of probabilis­
tic lotterie:s ati well as the axioms that iead to binary 
qualitative utility (QU) representation of possibilistic 
lotteries, we introduce an axiom system for pcb lotter­
ies and prove a representation theorem. We present 
one example in section 4. Section 5 discusses related 
literature. The final section has some concluding re­
marks. 
2 Partially Consonant Belief 
Functions 
Walley [14] has derived pcb in the context of the statis­
tical inference problem. The statistical inference prob­
lem is a triplet (X, 8, F) where set X is the sample 
space, set e is the parameter space, and P is the set 
of uncertainty measures on X conditioned on param­
eter values. A statistical evidence (observation) is a 
value x E X. The prior knowledge about parameters 
may or may not exist. The objective is to make some 
inferences about e. 
The Bayesian theory assumes that (1) P ={PolO E 8} 
is the set of probability functions on X parameterized 
by elements of 8; and (2) prior knowledge exists and 
is represented by a probability function on e. The 
observational evidence and prior knowledge are then 
combined by Bayes rule. 
The likelihood principle (LP) of statistics states that 
information contained in an observation x is ade­
quately captured by the likelihood function derived 
from it. The likelihood of a parameter (} given an ob­
servation x is the probability of observing x if (} is the 
true parameter i.e., likx(O) = P0(x). Moreover, pro­
portional likelihood functions are equivalent (see, for 
example, [1] for a detailed discussion). 
Dempster [3], and later Shafer [11, 12], arguing that 
the Bayesian assumption on the probability form of 
models and prior knowledge is not always supported 
by evidence, suggest a more general representation-
belief functions-for the purpose. Suppose that S is 
the set of possible worlds. A basic probability assign­
ment or bpa is a function 
m: 28 -+ [0, 1] (1) 
such that m(0) = 0 and L::Acs m(A) = 1. The value 
m(A) can be interpreted as- the probability that a 
world in A will be the true world. From a bpa, a 
number of other functions can be derived 
Bel(A) �� � m(B) 
B<;;A 
PIILI\�f "'�IB\ ... �v ... J - L.._.- "11\ J 
BnA,00 
Q(A) �� � m(B) 
A<;;B 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Bel is referred to as a belie} function, Pl as a plausibil­
ity function and Q as a commonality function. These 
are different forms of the same belief function since 
starting from any of these forms (m, Bel, Pl or Q), the 
other three can be recovered. 
The combination of independent belief functions is 
done via Dempster's rule. Suppose m1, m2 are two be­
lief functions, their combination is another belief func­
tion denoted by ( m 1 EB m2) defined as follows: 
(m1 EBm2)(A) = k-1 � m1(B1).m2(B2) (5) 
B1nB2=A 
where k is a normalization constant. 
In the special case when m2 represents the observation 
B (m2(B) = 1), m1 EB m2 is called the conditional of 
m1 given B (m1(-[B)). In terms of Pl, a conditional 
belief function assumes a familiar form 
Pl(A[B) = 
Pl(A n B) 
Pl(B) 
(6) 
In the statistical inference method argued by Shafer 
[12], prior knowledge, models and observation are rep­
resented in terms of belief functions. The act of infer­
ence is done by combining these belief functions using 
Dempster's rule. 
Since prior probability and conditional probabilities in 
Bayesian model are also belief functions, Walley asks 
under which conditions their combination by Demp­
ster rule is consistent with Bayes rule. He chooses to 
work with commonality form for convenience. Specifi­
cally, Walley studies functional Q that translates like­
lihood function likx which summarizes the Bayesian 
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model (X, e, F) and an observation x into a common­
ality function Q, and functional R that translates prior 
probability into a commonality function R. There are 
a number of desirable properties that Q, R (two-place 
mappings) should satisfy. Some technical assumptions 
are made. e is finite 1e1 = N. Sis the set of likelihood 
vectors, P is the set of prior probability vectors. In the 
axioms listed below (according to Walley's original or­
der), T, a stand for arbitrary likelihood vectors inS, p 
for any prior probability in P. Their components are 
denoted with subscription. Is is the characterisitic 
function of subset B � e. 
Al Q(·, T) is a commonality function over e. 
A2 Q(-, T) EB Q(·, a) = Q(·, Ta) if Ta E S 
A3 R(·, p) is a commonality function over e. 
A4 If PJTJ > 0 for some j, R(·, p)EBQ(-, T) = R(-, Top) 
where o denotes Bayes' rule. 
A7 Q(·,T) = Q(·, cT) for 0 < c < 1. 
A8 Q(-, 1) E8 Q(·, T) = Q(·, T). 
A9 If T E Sand Tis E S then Q(A,Tis) ex: Q(A,T) 
when A� Band Q(A,Tis) = 0 otherwise. 
Al and A3 convey the idea that belief functions are 
used to express evidence (observational and prior). A2 
requires that two views on multiple independent ob­
servations as a compound evidence and as the com­
bination of individual evidence are equivalent. A4 re­
quires that belief function treatment is consistent with 
Bayesian treatment when applicable. A7 and A8 re­
quire the consistency with LP. A9 requires consistency 
with Bayesian conditioning. Walley has the following 
theorem: 
Theorem 1 (Walley 1987 [14]) Assumptions Al, 
A3, A4, A 7, A8 and A9 and a number of technical 
conditions hold if and only if there is some A > 0 and 
some partition {A1,A2, ... A.} oj e such that for all 
pEp and T E S 
N 
R( {&i},p) = p?f L PJ 
j=l 
(7) 
(8) 
Q(!J, T) = 1 and Q(A, T) = 0 otherwise (9) 
where k(T) = 0:::;=! max{T/I&i E AJ})-1 
In addition, assumption A2 is satisfied only ij s = N. 
Because the satisfaction of Dempster's rule requires 
evidence presented as probability (s = N), Walley 
suggests that Dempter's rule cannot be used to com­
bine independent observations. However, all the ax­
ioms above (including A2) are satisfied if Dempster's 
rule is replaced by another rule ( 0) with the following 
definition. If Q1 (A).Q2(A) of 0 then 
otherwise Q1 0 Q2(A) �� 0. Where k is a constant 
selected in such a way that makes Q12 a commonality 
function. It is important to note that in special case 
when Q1 is a pcb and Q2 is an observation B (Q2(8) = 
1 if 8 E B and Q2(8) = 0 otherwise), Dempster's rule 
and the new rule has the same effect ( Q1 EB Q2 = QI 0 
Q2)· 
Parameter A in eq. 8 called the scale parameter. It is 
used to manipulate the weight of evidence, if necessary. 
From now on, we assume that A = 1. This means, for 
example, that there is no discounting of evidence. We 
also choose to work with the plausibility form of a pcb. 
Pl(A,T)=k(T)L.max{Til&iEAj} (11) 
j=l 
A belief function that satisfies equation 8 of theorem 
1 is called partially consonant. In terms of bpa, it can 
be seen that the foci are subsets of Ai 1 ::; i ::; s. 
Moreover, foci that are subsets of an Ai are nested. 
The significance of Walley's result is that (1) it points 
out the incompatibility between Dempster's rule and 
the likelihood principle, and (2) isolates a subclass of 
belief functions and an operation which make a mean­
ingful generalization of Bayesian inference while pre­
serving LP. The pcb class includes probability func­
tions and possibility functions as extreme cases cor­
responding to s = N and s = 1. In the intermediate 
case when 1 < s < N, pcb has a nice interpretation. It 
could be viewed as a model for a number of possibilis­
tic variables conditioned on a probabilistic variable. 
Pcb has not received the attention it deserves partly 
because Walley himself seems to dismiss its usefulness 
on the ground that the sure-loss or "Dutch book" ar­
gument can still be made against the use of pcb in deci­
sion making. To reach this conclusion, Walley makes 
an assumption that associated functions Bel and Pl 
of a pcb are interpreted as lower and upper betting 
rates. In the next section, we will develop a method 
of making decision with pcb and argue that Walley's 
assumption is not justified. 
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3 Mixed Utility 
In this section, we assume a pcb in the form of a plausi­
bility function Pl on a given partition {A1, Az, . .. As} 
of 8. Ai ={Iii!, IIi!, . . .  llinJ· 
s 
Pl(A) = L max{Pl( {II}) Ill E Ai n A} (12) 
i=l 
On the algebra A formed from {A1, Az, . . . A.}, Pl 
is an (additive) probability measure (denoted by P) 
i.e., for B1, Bz E A and B1 n Bz = 0, P(B1 U Bz) = 
P(B1) + P (Bz) . Since 2::;=1 P(Ai) = Pl(G) = 1, the 
normalization condition is also satisfied. 
Given Ai, the conditional plausibility Pl(-l .. 4i) on the 
algebra Ai 1 :S:: i :S:: s formed from the elements of 
Ai, is a possibility measure (denoted by IIi) i.e., for 
C1, Cz E A IIi( C1 u Cz) = max{IIi(CJ), IIi(Cz)}, and 
IIi(Ai) = Pl(Ai iAi) = 1. Thus, we have the following 
simple theorem. The proof is straightforward. 
Theorem 2 Plausibility function Pl in eq. 12 induces 
a probability function P on A and s (conditional) pos­
sibility functions IIi on Ai 1 ::; i ::; s. Conversely, 
given a probability function P on A and s possibility 
fu nctions IIi on Ai, the original Pl can be recovered. 
A (probabilistic) act is a mapping {A1, Az, ... As} --t 
Z where Z is the set of prizes. Act d delivers prize 
d(Ai) in case Ai occurs. An act induces a probabilistic 
lottery L, which is a probability function on Z. L(zi) 
is the probability of getting prize Zi. It is also denoted 
by [pdz1,p2/zz, . . .  ] where Pi = L(zi) and 2::;Pi = 1. 
Denote by Lp the set of probabilistic lotteries. The 
von Neumann and Morgenstern's utility theory (the 
exposition by Luce and Raiffa [8]) considers a prefer­
ence relation �P on Lp that is assumed to satisfy the 
following axioms 1 
Pl (Ordering of prizes) Preference �P on Z is com­
plete and transitive. There are z (the best) and 
.& (the worst prize) such that z >-p .& and for all 
z E Z, z �P z and z �P .&· 
P2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any com­
pound lottery (whose prizes are again lotteries) 
is indifferent to a simple lottery with prize in Z, 
the probabilities are calculated according to prob­
ability calculus. 
P3 (Continuity) Each prize z E Z is indifferent to a 
canonical lottery involving just z and _&. 
1 Derivative forms of strict preference (>-p) and indiffer­
ence ( � p) are defined as usual. 
P4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, each prize can 
be replaced by the canonical lottery that is indif­
ferent to it . 
P5 (Transitivity) �P on Lp is transitive. 
P6 (Monotonicity) [pjz,(l- p)/.&] �P [p'jz,(l­
p')h] iff p:::: p'. 
Theorem 3 (von Neumann & Morgenstern) 
�P satisfies axioms Pl - P6 iff there exists a util­
ity function u : Lp --t [0, 1] such that L1 � Lz iff 
u(L1):::: u(Lz). Moreover, u is unique up to a positive 
affine transformation and it has the form 
n 
u([pJ/zl,pz/Zz, . . . ,Pn/zn]) = L Pi·u(zi)· 
i=l 
Following vNM approach, in [6] we develop a util­
ity theory for possibilistic lotteries. Suppose W = 
{w1, Wz, .. . wk} is the set of prizes including the best 
('iii) and the worst (:!!!.) prizes. A possibilistic lottery 
is a possibility function on W. It is also denoted by 
[7rJ/WJ, 1r2/wz, ... ] where 1ri is the possibility of getting 
prize Wi· maxi 7r; = 1. The set of possibilistic lotteries 
is denoted by LII. We require that a preference relation 
�II on LII satisfies the following axioms. 
Ill (Ordering of prizes) Preference �II on W is com­
plete and transitive. There are w (the best) and 
:!!!. (the worst prize) such that 'iii >-II :!!!. and for all 
W E W, 'iii �II W and W �II:!!!.· 
II2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any com­
pound lottery (whose prizes are again lotteries) 
is indifferent to a simple lottery with prize in W, 
the possibilities are calculated according to possi­
bility calculus. 
II3 (Continuity) Each prize w E W is indifferent to 
a canonical possibilistic lottery involving just 'iii 
and :!Q. 
II4 (Substitutability) In any lottery, each prize can 
be replaced by the canonical lottery that is indif­
ferent to it . 
II5 (Transitivity) �II on LII is transitive. 
II6 (Monotonicity) [.\jw, p/:!!!.] �II [A' /'iii, p' /w] iff>.:::: 
>.' and p :S:: p'. 
Theorem 4 (Giang & Shenoy 2002) �II satisfies 
axioms II 1 - II6 iff there exists a utility function qu : 
LII --t B such that for II1, liz E LII, II1 �II liz iff 
qu(II J) » qu( Pi2). Moreover, qu has the form 
qu([7rJ/WJ, 11"2/Wz, . . .  , 7rm/wm]) = max {1ri.qu(wi)} l:Sz:Sm 
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where B �� { <>., p> I .A, p E [0, 1], max( .A, p) = 1 }; 
for <A, p>, <A', p'>E B, order » and max are defined 
as follows: 
<.A, p> » <.A', p'> iff .A 2: A' and p ::; p'; 
max{ <.A, p>, <A', p'>} ��<max( .A, .A'), max(p, p')>; 
The difference between this theorem and one by vNM 
is that for possibilistic lotteries the binary utility scale 
is used. The constrast between the binary utility for 
a possibilistic lottery and the real utility for a prob­
abilistic lottery has a parallel in the different formats 
that uncertainty is expressed. In possibility theory, 
uncertainty of an event is a pair of necessity and pos­
sibility. However, the probability of an event is a single 
real number. Interested readers are referred to [5] for 
a more detailed discussion. The binary utility scale is 
a set of pairs of number in the unit interval so that 
the maximum of two numbers is 1. The order » be­
tween pairs is such that a pair is better than the other 
if the left component (a real number) of the former 
is larger than the left component of the later and the 
right component of the former is smaller than corre­
sponding number of the latter. So the top element of 
B is <1, 0> and the bottom element is <0, 1>. 
The operation max applied to pairs will produce a new 
pair whose components are component-wise maxima. 
It is not used to choose the better (according to » ) 
among pairs. 
In our approach, the possibility degree of an event 
- plausibility of a consonant belief function - is not 
treated as an upper betting rate as suggested by Wal­
ley [ 15]. In [6, 5], we propose a framework (likelihood 
gambles) in which a person bets given a possibilitic 
lottery. A unknown parameter (} has two possible 
values { B1, B2}. For each point in the sample space 
x EX, one has (normalized) likelihoods Likx(B1) and 
Likx(B2)· Unlike a standard gamble in which rewards 
are pegged with the observation, in a likelihood gamble 
the rewards are pegged with the values of the unknown 
parameter. Specifically, given an observation x, what 
is a price that a person would be willing to pay for a 
contract that gives her $ 1  if the true value of (} is B1 
and nothing otherwise. Obviously, Walley's sure-loss 
argument against the use of pc b is void with respect 
to likelihood gambles. 
From the behavior of a decision maker toward likeli­
hood gambles, one can deduce her implicit prior prob­
abilities (of the event that true value of the parameter 
is B1). The idea is that given such priors, the decision 
maker will calculate the posterior probability on the 
parameter space. And thus, she converts the likelihood 
gamble to a standard gamble. In our framework, the 
implicit priors are not required to remain invariant in 
different intances of likelihood gambles (corresponding 
to different sample points). But instead, it can vary 
as long as monotonicity axiom (II6) is satisfied. For 
more details, readers are referred to [5]. Implicit priors 
can be used to differentiate decision maker's attitudes 
toward ambiguity (uncertainty) in contrast to the atti­
tudes toward risk which are represented by the shape 
of utility functions2• An implicit prior of less than . 5 
means ambiguity aversion. (It means that one is will­
ing to pay less than $.50 for a "fair" likelihood gamble 
[1/$1, 1/$ 0] in which the likelihood of (}1 is equal the 
likelihood of B2.) A value larger than .5 is ambiguity 
seeking and .5 means ambiguity neutral. 
Let us now return to our problem. We want to make a 
decision in a uncertain situation described by pcb Pl. 
An act is a mapping d : 8 -+ W where W is the set of 
prizes. We also summarize act d in the form of a lottery 
[a!/w1, a2/w2, ... , ak/wk] where ai = Pl(d-1 ( wi)) i.e., 
a; is the plausibility of an event whose occurences as­
sociated by act d with prize wi. Notice that unlike 
probabilistic or possibilistic lotteries, there is no ex­
plicit normalization condition for ai 1 ::; i ::; k. Denote 
by LB the set of lotteries. We consider preference rela­
tion t on L B and list a number of desirable properties 
along the line of vNM axioms. 
Bl (Ordering of prizes) Preference t on W is com­
plete and transitive. There are w (the best) and 
1!!. (the worst prize) such that w >- 1!!. and for all 
wE W, w t w and w t 1!!.· 
B2 (Reduction of compound lotteries) Any com­
pound lottery (whose prizes are again lotteries) 
is indifferent to a simple lottery with prize in W, 
the plausibilities are calculated according to belief 
function calculus. 
B3 (Continuity of prize) Each prize w E W is indif­
ferent to a canonical possibilistic lottery involving 
w and w. 
B4 (Substitutability) Indifferent lotteries can replace 
each other in any lottery. 
B5 (Transitivity) t on LB is transitive. 
B6 (Monotonicity) For canonical lotteries L1 
[.A/w, P/1!!.] and L2 = [A' /w, p' /1!!.], L1 t L2 iff 
A 2: A' and p::; p'. 
B7 (Equivalence between forms) Each canonical pos­
sibilistic lottery is indifferent to a canonical prob­
abilistic lottery. 
Bl, the same as Pl or Ill, is about order on the set 
of prizes. B2 means the following. Let us consider a 
2 Convexity means risk seeking, concavity means risk 
aversion and linearity means risk neutral. 
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compound lottery L = [a I/ L1, a2/ L2, ... ak/ Lk] where 
ai = Pl(Ei) i.e., the pcb plausibility of an event Ei 
associated with lottery-reward Li, 1 ::; i ::; k. Fur­
ther suppose Li = [bii/wl,biz/wz, ... b,n/wn] where 
bij = Pl(Eii [E,) i.e., conditional pcb plausibility of an 
event Eij associated with prize Wj. (Here Eij is de­
fined as the set of states that Li will deliver Wj. Eij 
can be empty.) Thus, if event Si � U�=1(Ei n Eii) 
occurs then the lottery holder is rewarded with prize 
Wj. Therefore, lottery [ci/w1, cz/wz ... ck/wk] where 
Cj = PI ( Sj) should be considered indifferent to the 
original compound L. Axiom B2 requires just that. 
If PI is a consonant belief function on 8, a lottery 
induced from an act, which delivers either w or w for 
each B E 8 is called a canonical possibilistic lottery. 
Axiom B3 requires that each prize w E Hl is indifferent 
to one of such lotteries. 
If PI is a probability function on 8, an act that de­
livers either w or 1!1. for each B E 8 induces a lottery 
called a canonical probabilistic. B7 requires that each 
canonical possibilistic lottery is indifferent to a canon­
ical probabilistic lottery. In other words, the deci­
sion maker must be able to switch between uncertainty 
forms attached to the prizes. This condition is strong 
but not unreasonable. For example, the most preferred 
canonical probabilistic lottery [1/w, 0/1!1.] is naturally 
considered as good as the best prize w, which, in turn, 
is considered the same as the most preferred canonical 
possibilistic lottery [1/w, 0/1!1.]. The argument works 
also for the worst prize i.e., we can reasonable claim 
[0/w, 1/1!1.] � 1!1. no matter how 1 and 0 are interpreted 
(as probability or as possibility ). Thus, the range cov­
ered by canonical probabilistic lotteries is the same as 
one covered by canonical possibilistic lotteries. 
It is should be noted that monotonicity axiom B6, as 
the order requirement, holds for both types of proba­
bilistic and possibilistic comparison i.e., the numbers 
can be interpreted either as probability or possibility. 
Theorem 5 If t on Ls satisfies axioms Bl - B7, 
then there exist functions qu: Lrr -+ B, u: Ls -+ [0, 1] 
and t: B-+ [0, 1] such that L1 t Lz iffu(L!) � u(Lz). 
Moreover, for L = [pi/ L1,P2! Lz, ... p./ Ls] and L, = 
[1ridw1, 1riz/wz, ... 1rik/wk] where Pi are probabilities 
and 1rij are possibilities 
Proof: Suppose lottery Lis induced by act d and pcb 
PI given in eq. 12. By Theorem 2, Pl is decomposed 
into a set of a probability function P and s conditional 
possibility functions rr, 1 :::: i :::: s. 
By axiom B2, L � L' where L' is the compound 
lottery [FI/L1,p2/Lz, ... p./Ls], where Pi = P(A,) 
for 1 ::; i ::; s. L, are possibilistic lotteries 
[7rii/wl, 1Tiz/wz, ... 1rik/Wk] where 1Tij = IIi(d-1(wj) n 
A;). 
Notice that Lrr � Ls, we show trr, which is t re­
stricted to Lrr, satisfies axioms Ill - II6 if t satisfies 
Bl-B7. It is easy to note that Bl and B3 are Ill and 
II3 respectively. When PI is consonant, B2 reduces to 
II2. B4 is slightly more general and therefore implies 
II4. Since t on Ls is transitive, trr on Lrr is transi­
tive too. Thus, II5 is satisfied. B6 reduces to II6 for 
possibilistic lotteries. By Theorem 4, there is a binary 
utility function qu : Lrr -+ B representing trr and for 
Li 
Suppose qu(L;) = < >.i, Pi >. Then it is not dif­
ficult to show Li �rr [>.;jw, p;/J!l.]. By axiom B7 
[>.;jw, Pdl!l.] � [q;/w, (1 - qi)/1!1.] for some 0 ::; qi ::; 1. 
By transitivity oft (B5), Li � [q;/w, (1- qi)/J!l.]. By 
substitutability (B4), [q;/w, (1- qi)/1!1.] can substitute 
Li in L' to obtain an indifferent L", which is a prob­
abilistic lottery. By reduction of compound lottery 
B2, L" is reduced to a canonical probabilistic lottery 
[q/w, (1- q)/1!1.]. Let us denote the set of probabilistic 
lotteries constructed with the set of prize Z equal to 
{w,J!l.} by L�. t restricted on L� is denoted by >::_p. 
It is not difficult to verify that axioms Pl - P6 are 
satisfied by tp. Pl is obvious because Z has two 
elements w and 1!1.· B2 restricted for probabilistic lot­
teries reduces to P2. P3 is trivially satisfied because 
Z has only two elements. P4 is satisfied due to B4. 
t is transitive, so tP is too. Thus, P5 is satisfied. 
B6 applied to probabilistic lotteries implies P6. By 
Theorem 3, tP is represented by a utility function 
u([q/w, (1- q)/1!1.]) = q.u(w) + (1- q).u(J!l.) (15) 
By transitivity, this is also the utility of the ongl­
nal pcb lottery. Let us make a convenient assump­
tion that u(w) = 1 and u(J!l.) = 0 and formalize 
equivalence relationship between canonical possibilis­
tic and canonical probabilistic lotteries by a func­
tion t : B -+ [0, 1] defined by t( < >., p >) = p iff 
[>.jw,p/J!l.] � [p/w, (1- p)/1!1.]. We can rewrite the 
equation 15 for lottery L = [FI/L1,pz/L2, ... p8/Ls] 
and Li = [1ril/w1, 1Tiz/wz, ... 1rik/wk] as 
s 
(16) 
This completes the proof. • 
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A prize w can be viewed as a lottery induced by act 
dw(B) = w for a e E 8 and a pcb m({B}) = 1. It 
means there is only one partition, s = 1, and p1 = 1. 
There is also one 'lrij = 1 (corresponding to B), and 
'lrij = 0 for other. Applying eq. 13 for that lottery, we 
have 
u(w) = t(qu(w)) (17) 
With this equality, formula in eq. 13 reduces to vNM 
linear utility for probabilistic lotteries 
k 
u([pi/w1,P2/w2, .. ·Pk/wk]) = L Pi·u(wi) 
i=l 
By definition of function t, ( t( < >.., p >) = p iff 
[>..jw, pjw] � [pjw, (1 - p)jw]), and axiom B6, it is 
clear that t is a strictly increasing function i.e., for 
b1, b2 E B, t(bi) 2 t(b2) iff b1 » b2. For possibilistic 
lotteries, formula in eq. 13 reduces to 
Thus, the ranking of lotteries by u is the same as rank­
ing by binary utility in Theorem 4. 
4 An Example 
In this example, we will offer our treatment of Ells­
berg's paradox [4]. In an urn, there are 90 balls of the 
same size. The balls are painted one of three colors: 
red, yellow and white. It is known that exact 30 balls 
are red. The proportions of yellow and white are not 
known. 
We consider four gambles. Gamble I A offers $1 if a 
randomly drawn ball is red, nothing otherwise. Gam­
ble IB offers $1 if the ball is yellow, nothing otherwise. 
Gamble IIA offers $1 if a randomly drawn ball is red 
or white, nothing if the ball is yellow. Gamble II B 
offers $1 if the ball is yellow or white and nothing if it 
is red. 
The uncertainty in the problem is nicely de-
scribed by the following pcb. m( {red}) 1 
and m( {yellow, white}) l This will de­
compose into a probability function P( {red}) = 
1 and P( {yellow, white}) � and a condi­
tional possibility function II (yellow l {yellow, white}) = 
II(white l{yellow, white}) = 1. 
We assume binary utility function qu($1) =< 1, 0 >, 
qu($0) =< 0, 1 > and qu(.4) =< 1, 1 >. The first two 
equalities are natural since $1 is the best outcome and 
$0 is the worst outcome. The last one also means 
that the implicit prior probability of getting $1 in a 
likelihood test is .4. This value, being less than .5, 
indicates a slight uncertainty aversion. 
1 0 
.33 <0, 1> .27 <1, 0> 
<0, 1> <0, 1> 
Figure 1: Ellsberg's lotteries IA and IB 
1 0 
.60 <0, 1> .67 <1, 0> 
<1, 0> <1, 0> 
Figure 2: Ellsberg's lotteries IIA and IIB 
Ells berg found that a sizable proportion of respondents 
prefered I A to I B and, at the same time, prefered 
II B to II A. This is a paradox because the observed 
preference violates Savage's sure-thing principle. 
In Figures 1 and 2 we show the calculation of mixed 
utility for the gambles. We have u(I A) = .33, u(I B) = 
.27, u(IIA) = .60 and u(IIB) = .67. This is consistent 
with the observed behavior. 
5 Related Works 
Smets [13] argues for a two-level process. At the credal 
level, an agent uses belief functions to represent and to 
reason with uncertainty. When there is a need to make 
a decision, the agent moves to another pignistic level 
in which the belief function is tranformed to a proba­
bility function. The vNM expected utilities for alter­
natives are calculated with respect to this probability 
function. Specifically, in the pignistic transformation, 
the mass that assigned to a subset is divided equally 
to each element in the set. For instance, the pignisitic 
transformation of the pcb in Ellsberg's paradox is a 
probability function 
With respect to Pset the utilities of the four lotteries 
are u(I A) = u(I B) = .33 and u(II A) = u(II B) = .66. 
This does not explain Ellsberg's paradox. It should 
be noted however, that this preference would be ob­
served in our framework for a uncertainty-neutral de­
cision maker who equated a "fair" likelihood lottery 
[1/$1, 1/$0] with $.50. 
Although Smets has argued otherwise, the pignistic 
probability function is obtained by applying the prin­
ciple of insufficient reasoning for non-singleton foci. 
Ironically, the main motivation for using belief func­
tions is the desire to avoid this ad hoc principle. 
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A discussion of pignistic transformation can be found 
in Cobb and Shenoy [2]. They argue for the use 
of plausibilistic transformation in which a probability 
function is obtained by normalization of plausibility 
values of singletons. For instance, plausibilistic trans­
formation for the same pcb Ellsberg's example is 
W ith respect to PPla, the utilities of the four lotter­
ies are u(IA) = .20, u(IB) = .40 and u(IIA) = .60, 
u( II B) = .80 These utilities are not able to explain 
Ells berg's paradox. Also, it suggests that I B >- I A, 
which is contrary to the observed empirical behavior. 
The p1anslhllity tr(l.n!3formation has a number of draw­
backs. Notice that the probabilities assigned to single­
tons in the original pcb are modified downward after 
translation. The magnitude of distortion depends on 
( 1) the total of masses assigned to non-singletons and 
( 2) the sizes of non-singleton foci. However, it is pos­
sible to argue that the plausibility transformation is 
for the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions, in 
which it is inappropriate to interpret belief and plau­
sibility functions as lower and upper bounds on some 
true but unknown probabilities. 
Walley [15] studies a class of imprecise probabilities: 
lower prevision and, its dual, upper prevision. This 
class includes belief functions as a subclass. He argues 
that imprecise probability allows only a partial prefer­
ence ordering among alternatives. The most one can 
make from such a partial order is to exclude all domi­
nated alternatives. The set of remaining alternatives, 
which may be large, is left to decision maker to choose 
by calling in an additional choice mechanism e.g., ran­
domization. This indeterminacy is a significant incon­
venience to the decision maker. This approach, devel­
oped for imprecise probability in general, also fails to 
take into account the specific structure offered by pcb. 
J affray [7], using lower probability semantics for belief 
function, shows that the axioms of vNM theory aug­
mented with a number of assumptions leads to Hur­
wicz's a-criteria. Utility of a belief function lottery is 
a weighted average of lower and upper expected utili­
ties 
use�(d) = a. inf up(d) + (1- a). sup up(d) (18) PEP PEP 
where P is the set of probability functions whose lower 
envelope is the belief function. 0 :": a :": 1 is inter­
preted as a pessimism index. Some drawbacks of this 
approach is that ( 1) it is expensive to work with a set 
(may be large) of probability functions; and (2) little 
is known about how to pick a. 
Schmeidler [10], Sarin & Wakker [9] argue for the use 
of Choquet expected utility (CEU) for non-additive 
probability or capacity. A real value set function v on 
8 is a capacity if it satisfies normalization conditions 
(v(0) = 0, v(8) = 1) and monotonicity (v(A) :": v(B) 
if A c B). Obviously, capacity includes lower pre­
vision studied by Walley [15], which in turn includes 
belief functions as a special class. 
For simplicity, we assume the prizes in W are measured 
in utility (in the unit interval) and are ordered w1 > 
w2 > . . .  > wk. Assume a dummy wk+l = 0. For 
a decision d with d-1(w;) = E;, 1 :": i :S k, Choquet 
expected utility given capacity v is defined as 
k 
CEU( d) = "\'rw.- w.,, \.vrd_. E· \ r,19\, 
' /  L..J� . � , ...  , \ J-1 Jl 
i== 1 
The CEU representation is obtained by relaxing a 
number of axioms that originally leads to vNM ex­
pected utility representation for probabilistic lotteries. 
The appeal of CEU is that it leads to an (complete) 
order of alternatives and is supported by intuitive ax­
ioms. However, when applied to belief function, use 
of CEU is not satisfactory on two accounts. First, 
like Walley's proposal, it fails to take into account the 
additional structure that belief functions, but not non­
additive probability in general, possesses. A more seri­
ous shortcoming that makes CEU unsuitable for belief 
functions is the fact that the ranking of lotteries by 
CEU depends on the forms in which uncertainty is 
represented. A belief function exists in many equiva­
lent forms: bpa (m), belief (Bel), plausibility (PI) and 
commonality (Q). It is easy to check by definitions of 
Bel ( eq. 2) and PI ( eq. 3) that both satisfy the def­
inition of a non-additive probability. Obviously, the 
ranking by CEU with respect to Bel is different from 
one by CEU with respect to Pl. In contrast, in our 
approach, qu avoids this shortcoming by using binary 
utilities. 
Let us calculate CEU with respect to Bel and Pl for the 
lotteries in Ellsberg's example. For IA, E1 ={red}, 
E2 = {yellow, white} because red is associated with 
$1 prize and yellow, white with zero. Using eq. 19, 
we find CEUse�(IA) = CEUpz(IA) = .33. For IE, 
we have E1 = {yellow}, E2 = {red, white}. We find 
CEUse�(IB) = 0 and CEUpz(IB) = .67. Therefore, 
CEUse1 ranks IA >-lB. However, CEUpz ranks IE>­
IA. 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we study decision making with a special 
class of belief functions called partially consonant be­
lief functions or pcb, which was introduced by Walley 
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[14]. Pcb is important because (1) it offers a meaning­
ful generalization of both probability and possibility 
(those are extreme cases) ; (2) it is the only subclass 
of belief functions, which is consistent with a number 
of fundamental principles of statistics. Pcb has a nice 
interpretation- it can be decomposed into a probabil­
ity function and a number of conditional possibility 
functions. 
We use an axiomatic approach for the problem. Our 
axiomatics is similar to and inspired by von Neumann 
- Morgenstern's linear utility theory. We prove a rep­
resentation theorem for a preference relation on pcb 
lotteries. Utility for a pcb lottery is a mixed construct 
of linear utility and binary utility. 
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